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Abstract 
 
In Privacy Preserving Data Publishing, various privacy models have been developed for employing anonymization 
operations on sensitive individual level datasets, in order to publish the data for public access while preserving the 
privacy of individuals in the dataset. However, there is always a trade-off between preserving privacy and data utility; 
the more changes we make on the confidential dataset to reduce disclosure risk, the more information the data loses 
and the less data utility it preserves. The optimum privacy technique is the one that results in a dataset with minimum 
disclosure risk and maximum data utility. In this paper, we propose an improved suppression method, which reduces 
the disclosure risk and enhances the data utility by targeting the highest risk records and keeping other records intact.  
We have shown the effectiveness of our approach through an experiment on a real-world confidential dataset.   
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1. Introduction  
Individual-level data (aka microdata), which can be used for detailed modeling and machine learning, usually contains 
private and sensitive information about individuals and thus generally cannot be made available for public access, at 
least no without processing to provide privacy guarantees. Attributes existing in microdata are generally classified 
into three categories: direct identifiers, quasi-identifiers (QID), and sensitive attributes (SA). Direct identifiers are 
unique to a person such as social security number. QIDs are not unique per person but when considered as a set, the 
combination of QID field values can be used to identify individuals with high probability. Examples are birthdate, 
gender, and zip code. SAs contain private information about individuals such as healthcare information. An 
“adversary” can disclose SA values about a person, called the “victim”, even when direct identifiers are removed if 
they know the QID values of the victim and can match them against QIDs appearing in the sensitive microdata. This 
raises the question of how data owners can share their data for research purposes while not violating individuals’ 
privacy. This problem has been recently studied in depth in the Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) area, in 
which microdata is anonymized such that the privacy of individuals in the confidential dataset is preserved up to a 
certain level. 
 
In addition to privacy preservation, it is of crucial not to lose too much information due to the anonymization 
operations because data users are always seeking to have as much information as possible. The challenge is the trade-
off between preserving privacy and data utility, i.e., the more we anonymize the data to better preserve individual’s 
privacy, the more information the data loses and the less data utility it preserves. This problem has been the subject of 
recent studies (discuss below) to improve privacy techniques to achieve higher data utility while not losing privacy. 
 
In this paper, we present a novel approach for reducing disclosure risk and enhancing data utility, which is effective 
on datasets with large number of SAs. We improve the anonymization operations by targeting only records at high 
risk of disclosure and keeping other records intact. We first overview a novel disclosure risk metric, which measures 
disclosure risk of each record. We then identify records with risk value greater than a threshold as high-risk records, 
and only anonymize these records to reduce disclosure risk.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Various privacy models have been proposed in the PPDP area, each specifies a privacy requirement that is achieved 
by employing anonymization operations on the sensitive microdata. “k-anonymity” is a fundamental, widely used 
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privacy model which requires anonymizing dataset such that groups of at least k records with equal QID value set are 
created [1]. This produces a dataset where an adversary finds at least k matched records for a victim for any QID value 
set, and thus the probability of uniquely identifying an individual's record decreases to 1 𝑘⁄ . Anonymization operations 
employed for this model were generalization and suppression. Generalization replaces the original values with more 
generalized ones. For example, the age of a person can be generalized to 10 years intervals, so a person who is 32 
years old might be transformed to the age value [30-40]. Suppression takes place at record or value level, meaning it 
deletes either the whole record or some values of a record. “ℓ-Diversity” [2] and “t-closeness” [3] are well-known 
privacy models which add other requirements to k-anonymity to better thwart disclosure attacks. ℓ-Diversity restricts 
each group of equal QID values to have diverse SA values and t-closeness requires the distribution of SA values within 
each group to be close to the distribution of SA values within the entire dataset.          
 
Early privacy models considered only a single sensitive attribute at a time, and extending these models to preserve 
multiple sensitive attributes incurs substantial information loss. In recent studies, researchers have focused on handling 
multiple SAs while preserving data utility, which is practical for real-world sensitive datasets. For instance, Wang and 
Zhu presented a novel algorithm that can thwart attacks to two SAs at a time [4]. Li et al. proposed a new approach 
called “slicing” to improve data utility of privacy techniques [5], and Susan and Christopher used this approach to 
address several SAs [6]. Some works have limited their approach to handle multiple SAs of the same type, e.g., 
multiple numeric SAs [7] or categorical ones [8]. 
 
In order to measure data utility of an anonymized dataset, various data utility metrics have been proposed in the 
literature. In this work, we use Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP) [9] as a measure to evaluate data utility of the 
anonymized dataset obtained from our proposed approach. NCP measures information loss by penalizing attribute 
values, which are transformed to more generalized values after anonymization. Some surveys have reviewed different 
privacy models, anonymization operations, privacy techniques, and data utility metrics [10, 11].   
 
3. Methodology 
Our approach improves the process of anonymizing sensitive microdata in terms of reducing disclosure risk and 
enhancing data utility. The novel idea is to present a disclosure risk metric that measures disclosure risk of each record 
of microdata, and identifying records at high disclosure risk. Then, choosing suppression as the anonymization 
operation, we propose a value suppression algorithm, which deletes values with the highest contribution in the 
disclosure risk measure for each high-risk record. Thus, our approach decreases disclosure risk since it suppresses 
high risk factors, and increases data utility because it only anonymizes high-risk records and keeps other records intact.          
 
3.1 Disclosure Risk Measure    
Our proposed disclosure risk measure is at record level and defined based on risk assessment, which is likelihood 
times consequence. Likelihood of a record r indicates the likelihood of being identified by an adversary and 
consequence specifies the sensitivity of the private information of r being revealed, if r is identified. For calculating 
likelihood and consequence, we split attributes into two sets; known set of attributes vs. unknown set of attributes. 
The known set contains attributes, which an adversary knows about a victim and uses to find matched records in 
microdata. The remaining attributes form the unknown set and contain private information which adversary wants to 
disclose for a victim. Likelihood and consequence in the proposed risk measure are calculated based on the known set 
and unknown set, respectively. In order to take into account an adversary with any known and unknown attributes, we 
are considering all subsets of attributes as possible known sets and their compliment subsets as unknown sets. Since 
each attribute has 2 possibilities − i.e., being in known set or in unknown set, having 𝑚 number of attributes, total 
number of known sets is equal to total number of unknown sets and is equal to 2𝑚. Considering all possible 
known/unknown sets, our proposed disclosure risk measure is defined as: 
 
 𝐷(𝑟) = ∑ 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) ×  𝛼 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟)
2𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
(1) 
where 𝐾𝑆𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set, 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ unknown set, and 𝛼 is consequence coefficient which is a constant 
value larger than 1 to magnify the effect of consequence in risk value. If a dataset contains large number of attributes, 
calculating our proposed disclosure risk will be computationally expensive. A heuristic pruning algorithm can be 
employed to remove known sets which are incurring very low likelihood values [12].  
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𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) indicates the likelihood that an adversary, who knows the attributes in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set for a victim, finds 
the record 𝑟 as the matched record for the victim. This consists of two terms − i.e., the probability that 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set 
is publicly known, and the uniqueness of 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set’s attribute values for record 𝑟 in microdata. It is formulated 
as:   
 
 
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) = ∏ 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗)
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖
 ×  
1
𝐹(𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖))
 
 
(2) 
where, 𝐴𝑗 is the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ attribute in 𝐾𝑆𝑖 , 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗) is the probability of 𝐴𝑗 to be publicly known, 𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is 𝐾𝑆𝑖’s attribute 
values for record 𝑟, and 𝐹(𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖)) is the frequency of 𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖) in microdata. 
 
The first term in likelihood implies how probable the set of attributes in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set is to be publicly known so 
that an adversary knows them about a victim. These probabilities are assigned by data publisher intuitively. The second 
term is the inverse frequency of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set values of the record 𝑟. This term implies the uniqueness of record 
𝑟 in the whole dataset and has the inverse correlation with the likelihood. If the values are frequent in microdata then 
the person whom record 𝑟 belongs to is less likely to be identified by those attributes. Including this term, likelihood 
is no longer a probability function in our measure. However, it is still a value between 0 and 1 for each record.  
 
𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) denotes how much private information of record 𝑟, embedded in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ unknown set, will be revealed, if 
that record is identified. Data publisher needs to assign sensitivity weights to both attributes and their values to specify 
how much the information is sensitive and private to be disclosed about a person. This term is derives as: 
 
 
𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑡) =  ∑ 𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × 𝑊 (𝑟(𝐴𝑗))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
 
 
(3) 
where, 𝑟(𝐴𝑗) is the value of 𝐴𝑗 for record 𝑟,  𝑊(𝐴𝑗) is the sensitivity weight of 𝐴𝑗, and W (r(Aj)) is the sensitivity 
weight of 𝑟(𝐴𝑗). Sensitivity weights are constant values between 0 and 1.  
 
3.2 Suppression Based on Records’ Disclosure Risk Values   
We are proposing a value suppression algorithm, which targets records with high disclosure risk value. Using the 
disclosure risk metric described above, we first calculate the risk of each record and find records with the disclosure 
risk value more than a threshold 𝛿. Then, for each of these records, we look through the values of (𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 ×  𝛼 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖) 
for all 𝑖, and find the split of attributes which results in the maximum of (𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖 ×  𝛼 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖). Having the known set with 
the most contribution in the risk value, we suppress the values of its attributes for the selected high-risk record.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Algorithm for proposed suppression method 
 
The proposed suppression algorithm is shown in Figure 1. High risk records are stored in 𝐻𝑅_𝑟, and 𝐻𝑅_𝐾𝑆𝑖/𝐻𝑅-
_𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖  indicates the split of attributes which has the highest contribution in risk value. 𝐻𝑅_𝐾𝑆𝑖 shows the known set 
of the split and 𝐻𝑅_𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖  is the unknown set of the split.  
 
3.3 Data Utility Measure on Suppressed Microdata 
We use Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP) metric to measure information loss on the suppressed microdata obtained 
from our value suppression algorithm. NCP of the anonymized dataset 𝐷′ with n number of records is derived as: 
Value Suppression Algorithm 
1. 𝐻𝑅_𝑟 = {𝑟|𝐷(𝑟) >  𝛿} 
2. for each 𝑟 in 𝐻𝑅_𝑟: 
3. 𝐻𝑅_𝐾𝑆𝑖/𝐻𝑅_𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖 = argmax
𝐾𝑆𝑖/𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
 (𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) ×  𝛼 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟)) 
4. for each 𝐴𝑗 in 𝐻𝑅_𝐾𝑆𝑖: 
5.  Suppress 𝑡(𝐴𝑗) 
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 𝑁𝐶𝑃(𝐷′) =
1
𝑛
 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑗  𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑗(𝑟𝑖)
𝑞
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
(4) 
In (4), 𝑞 is the number of QIDs. 𝑤𝑗  indicates how much information 𝐴𝑗 carries for utility and are assigned such that 
∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 = 1. 𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑗(𝑟𝑖) is the assigned penalty for 𝑟𝑖(𝐴𝑗) value. Since we have used suppression, this value is either 
an original value or a suppressed one. In the first case, the penalty is 0 and for the latter it is assigned to 1. If we assign 
equal weight of 1 𝑞⁄  to each QID, and since 𝑁𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑗(𝑟𝑖) is either 0 or 1, 𝑁𝐶𝑃(𝐷
′) is simplified as: 
 
 
𝑁𝐶𝑃(𝐷′) =  
1
𝑛
 ×  
1
𝑞
 × 𝑆 
 
(5) 
where, 𝑆 is the total number of suppressed values in the anonymized dataset. 
 
4. Experiment 
We have evaluated our approach on a sensitive microdata provided by the Social Research and Evaluation Center at 
Louisiana State University. The microdata contains 1,009,993 number of students (records) enrolled in Louisiana 
public schools between 1999-2011 school years, and 27 number of attributes from Louisiana Department of Education 
(LADOE), Office of Juvenile Justice (LAOJJ), and Department of Corrections (LADOC). This dataset is of high 
importance to social work researchers [13]. Examples of attributes are age, gender, ethnicity, homelessness, dropout 
flag, LADOC contact, and LAOJJ contact.  
 
4.1 Measuring Disclosure Risk and Applying Value Suppression  
The first step is to calculate disclosure risk for each record in the microdata based on our proposed disclosure risk 
measure. We need to assign each attribute the probability of being publicly known and sensitivity weight, plus 
sensitivity weight for each value within an attribute. Examples of these values for sample attributes are shown in Table 
1. The assigned sensitivity weights are either 0 or 1, and among 27 attributes, we set 1 for 19 attributes and this implies 
having 19 SAs. In this experiment, we set the consequence coefficient (α) to 100.  
 
Table 1. Examples of assigned publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights 
Attribute Publicly Known Probability Attribute Sensitivity Weight Value Sensitivity Weight 
Value Weight 
Age 0.05 0 --------- 
Gender 0.8 0 --------- 
Dropout Flag 0.005 1 Yes 1 
No 0 
LADOC Contact Flag 0.001 1 Yes 1 
No 0 
 
For the parameters specified, we have calculated the disclosure risk measure for each record in the sensitive microdata. 
The histogram of risk values among the 1,009,993 records is shown in Figure 2 with blue-colored bars. In this 
experiment, we set 0.01 for the threshold 𝛿 and as shown in Figure 2, about 1.5% of records are at high risk of 
disclosure. We employed our value suppression algorithm on the high-risk records and obtained an anonymized 
dataset.   
 
4.2 Disclosure Risk Evaluation on the Anonymized dataset 
In order to evaluate the reduction in disclosure risk after anonymization, we have calculated the disclosure risk on the 
anonymized microdata and compared the risk values with those of the original microdata. 
       
Table 2. Number of high-risk records before and after anonymization  
Number of  high-risk records (risk>0.01) 
Original Dataset 15651 records (1.55%) 
Anonymized Dataset 8597 records (0.85%) 
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Table 2 shows that the number of high-risk records is reduced by 45%. The comparison of the histogram of risk values 
among records between the original microdata and anonymized microdata is illustrated in Figure 2. The comparison 
implies that the number of records having disclosure risk values of more than 50 decreases significantly after value 
suppression. Therefore, it is concluded that our proposed value suppression anonymization operation is highly 
effective on preventing occurrences of high disclosure risk values. However, it is shown that the number of records 
having disclosure risk values of less than 10 and more than 0.5 increases after value suppression. This is justified 
because of our choice of anonymization operation, which is suppression. When we delete some values of an attribute, 
the number of occurrences of that value for that attribute becomes smaller. Therefore, the second component of 
likelihood, which has the inverse correlation with the frequency of attribute, becomes larger for records having their 
attribute values suppressed and this may increase risk value for some records.    
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparing Histogram of Records Disclosure Risk Values before and after Value Suppression 
4.3 Data Utility Evaluation on the Anonymized dataset 
Since this dataset contains large number of SAs, this experiment implies the effectiveness of our approach on large 
number of SAs, in terms of preserving data utility. We have compared our obtained anonymized dataset with the 
anonymized dataset obtained from “k-anonymity”, “𝓵-Diversity”, and “t-closeness” privacy models based on NCP 
measure. These privacy models are employed through ARX anonymization tool [14]. Looking at the assigned publicly 
known probabilities to each attribute, we have chosen the attributes with the probability of more than 0.01 as QIDs, 
which are 10 attributes. For “𝓵-Diversity”, and “t-closeness”, which require specifying SAs, attributes other than QIDs 
are counted as SAs (17 number of SAs).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparing data utility of the anonymized dataset obtained from multiple approaches 
Figure 3 indicates that the anonymized dataset obtained from our approach outperforms other approaches by having 
the least information loss. It is also shown that increasing k value in “k-anonymity” incurs more information loss, 
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since it implies stricter privacy model. The reason why “ℓ-Diversity” incurs huge information loss is that the values 
of SAs in our dataset are highly skewed and it is already stated that ℓ-Diversity is not an effective model in these cases 
[3]. Moreover, this comparison denotes the fact that having more SAs leads to higher information loss.   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to reduce disclosure risk while preserving data utility. We presented 
a novel suppression method, which targets records at high risk of disclosure. We initially proposed a disclosure risk 
metric, which measures the risk of each record. Then value suppression algorithm is designed to suppress only the 
values of attributes, which have highest contribution in risk measure. By deleting these values, we are reducing the 
risk of high-risk records and since our proposed suppression algorithm considers only high-risk records, the other 
records staying intact and data utility is preserved. We have conducted an experiment on a confidential dataset with 
19 SAs. Comparing the disclosure risk after suppression, the number of high-risk records is reduced by 45%. Besides, 
the information loss on the anonymized dataset is 0.39%, which indicates that our anonymization approach does not 
incur huge information loss on datasets with large number of SAs. Our proposed approach is dependent on a set of 
pre-defined parameters such as publicly known probabilities, sensitivity weights, and delta. In the future work, these 
parameters need to be characterized in terms of their effect on the disclosure risk values. Our approach can be extended 
for improving “Generalization”, which is expected to enhance data utility, since generalization incurs less information 
loss compared to suppression.    
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